CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment-New Jersey's Offensive Language Statute Limited by "Fighting Words" Construction-State v. Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. 594, 303 A.2d 889 (1973); State
v. Brown, 62 N.J. 588, 303 A.2d 886 (1973).
David Rosenfeld and George Brown were charged and convicted
as disorderly persons for violating New Jersey's offensive language
statute.1 Rosenfeld had addressed a public assembly in the local school
auditorium on the topic of racism in the school system. He became
emotionally overwrought and concluded his talk with a remark in
which he repeatedly uttered a scurrilous epithet.2 A police chief who
had attended the gathering filed a complaint charging Rosenfeld with
using loud and indecent language at a public meeting, and Rosenfeld
was subsequently arrested at his home.3 His conviction rested on the
determination that his remark was likely to affect the sensibilities of
4
the hearers.
In a similar incident, George Brown had attended a public meeting of the local board of education, which had convened in a high
school cafeteria. A police officer ordered him to move away from the
area reserved for board members. Brown encountered the officer later
during the meeting and uttered abusive and vulgar language at him. 5
The police officer filed a complaint the following day,6 and Brown was
subsequently convicted.7 The appellate division sustained the convic1 N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-29 (1971) provides in pertinent part:
1. Any person who utters loud and offensive or profane or indecent language in any public street or other public place, public conveyance, or place to
which the public is invited;

Is a disorderly person.
2 State v. Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. 594, 596, 303 A.2d 889, 891 (1973). Rosenfeld stated that

if the whites didn't do something about the racial situation, "then the Mother F_ing
town, the M.F. county, the M.F. state and the M.F. country would burn down." Id.
8 Id.
4 Id. at 599, 303 A.2d at 892. The facts showed that there were women and teenagers in the audience and that the reaction to Rosenfeld's speech ranged from "very
shocked" to no reaction at all. Id. at 596-97, 303 A.2d at 891.
5 State v. Brown, 62 N.J. 588, 590, 303 A.2d 886, 887 (1973). The language used by
- remember you work
f
Brown was as follows: "I'll kick the s___ out of you, you m.
for me-you take that badge off and I'll kill you." Id.
6 Complaint, No. 4697 (Roselle, N.J., Mun. Ct., July 1, 1971).
7 Brown was convicted in the Municipal Court of Roselle, New Jersey on a finding
that his loud utterances were likely to incite violent action. On appeal to the Union
County Court, that court concluded that the words were not loud and that they could
not create a breach of the peace. The court did hold, however, that they were words
which would affect the sensibilities and found Brown guilty under the statute. State v.
Brown, No. A-443-71 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., July 7, 1972). Slip Opinion at 2-3.
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tion on a finding that the words used were "likely to evoke an immediate violent response by the person to whom they were addressed," 8
and Brown appealed to the New Jersey supreme court. 9
Rosenfeld appealed his conviction'0 and ultimately his case
reached the United States Supreme Court, which vacated judgment
and remanded the case to the New Jersey appellate division for reconsideration in light of recent standards limiting a state's right to proscribe opprobrious language." Based on these guidelines, the appellate
division determined that the statute was "overly broad and violative of
the First Amendment" and thus struck down the statute and nullified
Rosenfeld's conviction.' 2 The state appealed this decision to the New
Jersey supreme court.'2
The New Jersey supreme court decided both cases on the same
day. In State v. Rosenfeld, 4 the court held that the appellate division
had needlessly invalidated the statute in its entirety, and that even
under United States Supreme Court standards the state may still proscribe the use of words in public places which are likely to cause a
breach of the peace.'2 The court construed the offensive language statute as prohibiting only those words spoken as fighting words, thus re8 Id. at 5. The appellate division made its own review of the record and found that
Brown's words, "in the context and circumstances used," were "fighting words." Id.
9 The appeal was brought pursuant to N.J.R. 2:2-1. State v. Brown, 62 N.J. 588, 589,
303 A.2d 886, 887 (1973).
10 The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied Rosenfeld's petition for certification.
State v. Rosenfeld, 59 N.J. 435, 283 A.2d 535 (1971).
11 Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). The judgment was vacated and the
case remanded for consideration in light of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
On the day the Court sent Rosenfeld back, it also vacated and remanded two other
offensive language cases: Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), and Brown
v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972). There was a vigorous dissent in Rosenfeld to the
Court's actions in these three cases, typified by the following:
When we undermine the general belief that the law will give protection against
fighting words and profane and abusive language such as the utterances involved in these cases, we take steps to return to the law of the jungle.
408 U.S. at 902 (Burger, C.J., joined by Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
12 State v. Rosenfeld, 120 N.J. Super. 458, 459, 295 A.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1972). The
court held:
Based on Gooding, we have no alternative but to hold that N.J.SA. 2A:17029(1), as construed by our Supreme Court in State v. Profaci, is overly broad
and violative of the First Amendment. Gooding states that it matters not that
the words used might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly
and precisely drawn statute. If the statute is susceptible of application to protected expression, it must be struck down as overbroad.
id.
18 State v. Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. 594, 596, 303 A.2d 889, 890 (1973).
14 62 N.J. 594, 303 A.2d 889 (1973).
15 Id. at 601, 303 A.2d at 893.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:108

moving any judicial interpretation which might be considered overbroad. 16 In State v. Brown, 7 the court found that the words used by
Brown constituted fighting words and were thus within the reach of
the state's police power under the narrow Rosenfeld construction.""
Retroactively applying the statute which Rosenfeld had resurrected,
the court sustained Brown's conviction. 9
The "fighting words" concept, as an exception to constitutionally
guaranteed speech, originated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.20 The
facts therein revealed that a hostile crowd had gathered around Chaplinsky as he was distributing religious literature on a public street.
Following a minor disturbance, a police officer began escorting Chaplinsky to the station house. While on the way, they encountered a city
marshall who warned the defendant that "the crowd was getting restless." In response, Chaplinsky verbally vented his angry frustration,
and a complaint was filed against him. 2.I He was subsequently found
22
guilty of having violated New Hampshire's offensive language statute,
whereupon he brought appeals which ultimately reached the United
States Supreme Court.
The specific issue before the Court was whether New Hampshire's
statute contravened the fourteenth amendment by being "so vague
and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due
process. ' 23 Examining the state's judicial construction of the statute,
the Supreme Court found that the state courts had limited the statute's
application to words having " 'a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.' "24
16 Id.

at 603, 303 A.2d at 894.

17 62 N.J. 588, 303 A.2d 886 (1973).
18 Id. at 591, 303 A.2d at 888.

19 Id. at 592-93, 303 A.2d at 889.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
21 Id. at 569-70. The complaint charged that Chaplinsky
did unlawfully repeat, the words following, addressed to the complainant, that
is to say, "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists," the same
being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names.
Id. at 569. See State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 312, 18 A.2d 754, 757 (1941).
22 Ch. 378, § 2, [1926] N.H. Laws 1470, as amended, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570:2
(1955), stated:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him
by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his
presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent
him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
28 315 U.S. at 574.
24 Id. at 573 & n.7. (Although the Court cites State v. Brown, 68 N.H. 200, 38 A.
731 (1895), and State v. McConnell, 70 N.H. 294, 47 A. 267 (1900), as sources for this
20

NOTES
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Under such construction, the Court held the statute to be narrowly
limited to punishing that specific conduct which lies within the police
power of the state. 25 It concluded that, since the words used by the
defendant were likely to provoke the average person to retaliate,
Chaplinsky's language constituted fighting words punishable under the
state statute.

26

In reaching its decision, the Court assumed that certain epithets
had an inherent tendency to provoke a fight and "by general consent
[were] 'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile."2 7 The
Court found it unnecessary to consider extrinsic circumstances or the

actual imminence of violence, choosing instead to rely on the inherent
nature of the utterance in determining the criminality of the language.
It broadly stated in dictum that the right to free speech was not absolute, and that there were certain classes of speech whose social value
was so slight that their prevention and punishment had never raised a
constitutional problem. 28 These included
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict
29
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Thus, although the Court sustained Chaplinsky's conviction under

what it held to be a sufficiently narrow "fighting words" construction,
its sweeping dictum indicated that the mere utterance of certain
epithets constituted fighting words which the state could punish without a further showing of some actual threat to the peace.
It was not until State v. Profaci,30 wherein the defendant directed
offensive language at a police officer, 31 that the "fighting words" concept was established in New Jersey as a discrete category of proscribable
speech.3 2 Prior authority in New Jersey had indicated a general judicial
quotation, close examination of both of these cases fails to reveal the statement quoted
by the Court. In fact, the source of this quote appears to be State v. Chaplinsky,
91 N.H. 310, 313, 18 A.2d 754, 757 (1941)).
25 315 U.S. at 573.
26 Id. at 574. The Court found it unnecessary to demonstrate that the words used
by Chaplinsky, "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist," were fighting words. Id. In
effect, these epithets were deemed to be per se fighting words.
27 Id. at 573 (quoting from State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. at 320, 18 A.2d at 762).
28 315 U.S. at 571-72.
29 Id. at 572 (citing to Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (1941))
(footnote omitted).
80 56 N.J. 346, 266 A.2d 579 (1970).
31 Id. at 348-49, 266 A.2d at 581.
32 The offensive language statute enacted at the turn of the century was part of a
broader scheme to keep public places clear of loiterers, inebriates, and brawling types:
3. Any person or persons who shall loiter or assemble on the streets, at the
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posture which interpreted the mere use of loud and offensive or indecent language in a public place as being beyond the protective
aegis of the first amendment and susceptible to proscription under the
police power of the state. 33 Profaci implicitly defined fighting words as
loud, public utterances "likely to incite the hearer to an immediate
breach of the peace." The court also indicated that the words must be
spoken with the intent to have such consequences or with reckless disregard of the probability of such consequences.3 4 It crystallized its
analysis of those instances in which the state may punish expressions of
free speech under the statute:
corners of the streets, or in the public places of any city, village, borough, or
township of this state, being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or who
not being under such influence shall indulge in and utter loud and offensive or
indecent language, or shall address or make audible and offensive remarks or
comments upon any person passing along such streets or public places...
shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person.
Law of June 14, 1898, ch. 239, § 3, [1898] N.J. Laws 943. A later supplement extended
the provisions of this law to apply to quasi-public and private property. Law of March
11, 1924, ch. 173, [1924] N.J. Laws 385.
The current law, adopted in 1965, appended "profane" as a category of proscribed
speech, but restricted the scope of the act to public areas. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-29
(1971).
83 Some cases specifically examined and rejected the contention that first amendment protections apply to offensive language in public places. See Karp v. Collins, 310
F. Supp. 627, 638 (D.N.J. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nor. Kugler v. Karp, 401
U.S. 933 (1971) (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-29(l) found not to be unconstitutional on
its face); State v. Morgulis, 110 N.J. Super. 454, 461, 266 A.2d 136, 140 (App. Div. 1970)
(defendant's chant of verbal obscenities was held not protected by first amendment);
State v. Rullis, 79 N.J. Super. 221, 232, 191 A.2d 197, 202-03 (App. Div. 1963) (indecent
language not protected by constitutional guarantees, and statute is valid exercise of
police power); State v. O'Donnell, 200 A. 739, 741 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1934) ("rat" and "scum
of the earth" found to be clearly offensive epithets outside the limits of first amendment rights, when uttered in a deliberate manner).
Other cases, while not raising first amendment considerations, indicated that the
power to proscribe such language is dearly vested in the state. See State v. Griffin, 92 N.J.
Super. 389, 391, 223 A.2d 633, 635 (App. Div. 1966) (police car was not a "public conveyance" within the meaning of the statute); State v. Taylor, 38 N.J. Super. 6, 28, 118
A.2d 36, 48 (App. Div. 1955) (obscene utterance to policeman); In re Kirk, 101 N.J.L.
450, 452, 130 A. 569, 570 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (mere use of term "bootlegger," in reference
to a member of the town council, spoken at a public session, held to be flagrantly contemptuous and properly prosecuted); Mullen v. State, 67 N.J.L. 451, 453, 51 A. 461, 461
(Sup. Ct. 1902) (loud language at a public meeting must also be offensive or indecent to
sustain a conviction). Cf. McCooey v. Megill, 135 N.J.L. 217, 51 A.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
State v. Burkitt, 120 N.J.L. 393, 200 A. 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1938). But see Ruthenbeck v. First
Criminal Judicial Dist. Court, 7 N.J. Misc. 969, 970, 147 A. 625, 625 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (not
every trivial epithet addressed to another constitutes disorderly conduct).
84 56 N.J. at 353, 266 A.2d at 583-84. The court further noted that a speaker could
be convicted under the statute where the listener's gender and age were such that the
words uttered would be likely to affect his or her sensibilities. Id.
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[T]he implicit constitutional purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:170-29(1) is
two-fold, i.e., to preserve the peace and to protect the sensibilities
of those persons within hearing of the person uttering the lan35
guage.
Thus, the state established two alternatives under which it might
prosecute offensive language.
In adopting the "fighting words" concept, Profaci relied extensively on the broad dictum set forth in Chaplinsky and impliedly
affirmed the position that fighting words are determined by the innate
vulgarity of the words spoken rather than by the external circumstances surrounding their utterance. However, the court held that the
utterance of the four-letter words toward the police officer by the
defendant did not constitute a violation of the statute under the circumstances. 36 Therefore, while ostensibly approving the Chaplinsky
dictum, Profaci narrowly applied the "fighting words" concept in light
37
of controlling circumstances.
38
the Supreme Court effectively restricted
In Cohen v. California,
the use of the "fighting words" concept to situations in which a fight
was imminent. The defendant in Cohen had been convicted under an
offensive conduct statute for having a vulgar epithet embossed on his
jacket. 39 The Court determined that the only conduct which the state
sought to punish was communication, and that Cohen's conviction
35 Id. at 353, 266 A.2d at 583.
36 Id., 266 A.2d at 584. The court stated that
an anlysis [sic] of the facts fails to disclose that the language used under the
circumstances was likely to incite a breach of the peace or to offend the sensibilities of the listener.
Id. (emphasis added). The facts indicate that the defendant was stopped for a routine
automobile check. When the officer found that Profaci's driver's license was not signed,
are you bothering me for." Id. at 348,
defendant became excited and said, "what the f.
266 A.2d at 580-81.
37 Similarly, in State v. Reed, 56 N.J. 354, 266 A.2d 584 (1970), a motorist told a
state trooper, "Jesus Christ. I don't give a God damn who the hell you are." Id. at 356,
266 A.2d at 585. The court examined the surrounding circumstances and concluded that
the words and their effect were not within the contemplation of the offensive language
statute. Id. at 357, 266 A.2d at 586. In In re B.N., 99 N.J. Super. 30, 238 A.2d 486 (App.
Div. 1968), the court reviewed the defendant's violent conduct and language and concluded:
It is difficult to conceive of more inflammatory words than those allegedly
uttered by the defendant here, vulgar expressions indicating that the arresting
officer was guilty of incest with his mother, uttered in a loud tone of voice in
the presence of witnesses.
Id. at 36, 238 A.2d at 489.
38 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
39 Id. at 16. Cohen's jacket bore the words "Fuck the Draft." He was observed in
a courthouse corridor where women and children were present. Id.
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amounted to an interference with his right of free speech. 40 It found
that since no individual, either actually present or likely to be present,
could have taken Cohen's symbolic conduct as a direct personal insult,
and since no evidence indicated that anyone was in fact aroused, the
mere manifestation of vulgar language did not constitute fighting
words. 41 The Court then concluded that the state did not have authority
to excise a particular scurrilous epithet from public discourse, either
upon the theory that its use was inherently likely to cause violent
reaction or upon the more general assertion that the state may do so as
42
guardian of public morality.
43
Relying in part on Chaplinsky, the Court in Gooding v. Wilson
held that a statute encroached upon constitutionally protected expression if the state's construction failed to limit its application to words
44
having a direct tendency to provoke violent reaction by an addressee.
45
Wilson had been convicted under an offensive language statute
which the Georgia judiciary had applied in past decisions to scurrilous
language without a showing that such language constituted fighting
words. 46 The Supreme Court found that the statute's construction swept
too broadly and did not "define the standard of responsibility with
requisite narrow specificity. ' 47 The Court indicated that since such a
statute had a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected
expression, its overbreadth may be attacked by any person charged
under it-even one whose speech may have in fact constituted fighting
words. 48 Unless a state construed its offensive language statute to apply
40 Id.

at 18. See also Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest," the First Amendment and the

Boston Tea Party, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 185 (1970).

403 U.S. at 20-21.
Id. at 23-26. The Court reasoned:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words
without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
43 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
44 Id. at 522-23.
45 Law of August 18, 1919, No. 291, [1919] Ga. Acts 103-04 and Law of April 9, 1963,
No. 358, [1963] Ga. Acts 455-57, as amended, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2610 (1972). Wilson
was one of a group of persons engaged in picketing an army induction headquarters.
The group proceeded to block the entrances to the building and a scuffle ensued when
police attempted to remove them. In addition to a charge of assault and battery, Wilson
was accused of using the language "[w]hite son of a bitch, I'll kill you," and "[y]ou son
of a bitch, I'll choke you to death" toward one individual, and "[y]ou son of a bitch,
if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces," to another person.
Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 534, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1967).
46 405 U.S. at 528.
Cantwell v.
47 Id. at 527. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964);
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
48 405 U.S. at 521. The Court stated:
41

42
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to fighting words explicitly and exclusively, the statute would be
40
deemed void on its face for overbreadth.
Since Rosenfeld's conviction was grounded on language which
merely offended the sensibilities of the hearer, Cohen required that the
conviction be set aside; and Gooding necessitated that the statute
permitting such a conviction be voided. The New Jersey supreme court,
however, interpreted these two cases as allowing states to proscribe the
use of words in public places likely to cause breaches of the peace. 50
By thus limiting the statutory construction to Profaci's first alternative,
preserving the peace, and by eliminating the second alternative, protecting the listener's sensibilities, the court restored the constitutionality of the statute. 51 Rosenfeld did not add to the "fighting words"
concept, but simply restated the first alternative with continued approval. The state argued that the holding in Rosenfeld should have
been structured to permit the state to proscribe offensive language
which amounts to a public nuisance. 52 The court, however, found that
"Although a statute may be neither vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid
as applied to the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he is permitted
to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others. And
if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be applied to
him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the
statute. The statute, in effect, is stricken down on its face."
Id. (quoting from Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting)). See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960). But see Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971). See generally Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of
Younger: The View From Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1.
49 405 U.S. at 523. The dissent in Gooding disputed this issue of overbreadth.
Chief Justice Burger stated:
It is not merely odd, it is nothing less than remarkable that a court can find a
state statute void on its face, not because of its language-which is the traditional test-but because of the way courts of that State have applied the statute
in a few isolated cases, decided as long ago as 1905 and generally long before
this Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire ....
Id. at 528-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See Id. at 534 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. I
REV. 844, 852-53, 892, 894-96 & nn.189 & 190 (1970).
50 Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. at 601-03, 303 A.2d at 893-94.
51 Id. at 603-04, 303 A.2d at 894-95.
52 Id. at 602, 303 A.2d at 894. When Rosenfeld came before the United States Supreme Court, Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, raised this issue of regulating
vulgar speech through nuisance laws:
I agree with this view that a verbal assault on an unwilling audience may be so
grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be the proper subject of criminal proscription, whether under a statute denominating it disorderly conduct,
or, more accurately, a public nuisance.
408 U.S. at 906 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(l)(a), (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Offensive or indecent language as a public nuisance has been discussed in Von
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the task of instituting explicit nuisance regulations for offensive speech
within the constitutional boundaries of Cohen and Gooding should
be left to the legislature. 53 Thus, until the legislature acts, the state,
by dint of Rosenfeld, may only punish that public language which
constitutes fighting words.
In Brown, the defendant's language was deemed to be "grossly
offensive and highly provocative. ' 54 Brown argued, however, that even
if his speech did constitute fighting words, he could not be constitutionally convicted under a law which had been deemed unconstitutionally broad and, therefore, void at the time of his arrest and conviction.
The court held that the Rosenfeld construction could constitutionally
be applied to Brown retroactively, 55 and that, under the facts, such
application would embrace no element of unfairness. 56
Since the "fighting words" concept now remains the only conduit
through which the state may proscribe offensive language, perhaps
the court could have redefined that standard more clearly. By merely
Sleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244, 1257 (supplemental opinion) (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638, 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). See State v. Ceci, 255 A.2d 700 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969). Cf. City of St. Paul v.
Azzone, 287 Minn. 136, 177 N.W.2d 559 (1970); City of St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn.
467, 104 N.W.2d 902 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815 (1961). See also Henkin, Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 393 (1963); Annot.,
48 A.L.R. 83, 89 (1927).
58 62 N.J. at 602, 303 A.2d at 894.
54 62 N.J. at 593, 303 A.2d at 889. Brown's choice of language and the direct manner in which he confronted the officer prima facie fell within the guidelines of Chaplinsky and Profaci. The epithets were of the type likely to provoke the average person
to retaliate (Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574) and they were uttered in apparent reckless
disregard of the probable consequences (Profaci, 56 N.J. at 353, 266 A.2d at 584).
55 62 N.J. at 593, 303 A.2d at 888-89. The court relied on peripheral dictum in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7 (1965), to support this retroactive application. Quoting from Justice Brennan's dictum in Dombrowski, the New Jersey court
stated that
"once an acceptable limiting construction is obtained, it may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the construction, provided such application affords fair
warning to the defendants."
62 N.J. at 592, 303 A.2d at 889 (quoting from Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 491
n.7) (citations omitted by the court). See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 259-61
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 99
(1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). But see Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195,
198 (1966).
56 The court in Brown determined that since the defendant must have known his
speech to be grossly offensive and highly provocative, the retroactive application embraced no element of unfairness. 62 N.J. at 593, 303 A.2d at 889. This finding ostensibly
satisfies the fourteenth amendment element of fair warning which is necessary to render
conviction constitutional. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-12 (1972);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
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reaffirming Profaci's first alternative, Rosenfeld and Brown implicitly
sustained the view, originally promulgated in Chaplinsky, that certain
expressions per se constitute fighting words. 57 The court did not
definitively decide whether external circumstances or inherent vulgarity
renders a scurrilous utterance proscribable under the "fighting words"
concept. In light of Cohen's strong implication that the state cannot
predetermine what epithets are fighting words solely by virtue of their
vulgarity, 5 Brown should have expressly judged the defendant's remarks by a standard which places more stress upon external circumstances and less reliance upon the content of the language.
Cohen demonstrated that unless the facts clearly show that an
utterance generates a menace of physical violence, the "fighting words"
standard is inapplicable, and the state may not interfere with the
speaker. 59 In other words, the factual circumstances and not the words
themselves must determine whether the encounter approached the
brink of public disorder. The "fighting words" standard should serve
as an evidential mechanism to determine the point at which a defendant's language transgresses the limits of free speech and precipitates
an imminent breach of the peace.
If the tenor of Cohen is to be followed, New Jersey's "fighting
57 Chaplinsky relied in part on the theory that certain words, as a matter of common knowledge, have an inherent quality to provoke another person to a fight, and that
the mere use of such words is sufficient to violate the statute. 315 U.S. at 574.
The presumption that certain utterances have an innate tendency to provoke violence was attacked by Justice Loevinger in his dissenting opinion in City of St. Paul v.
Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 480-81, 104 N.W.2d 902, 910-11 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815
(1961):
[I]t is quite impossible to determine how offensive any particular expression is.
To begin with, curses, oaths, expletives, execrations, imprecations, maledictions,
and the whole vocabulary of insults are not intended or susceptible of
literal interpretation. They are expressions of annoyance and hostility-nothing
more. To attach greater significance to them is stupid, ignorant, or naive. Their
significance is emotional, and it is not merely immensurable but also variable.
...
The standards of verbal behavior of those social groups within which judges
move are not fairly applicable to the entire population.
Speaking for the majority in Cohen, Justice Harlan also observed that
while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
403 U.S. at 25. See Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1169, 1185 (1970).
58 403 U.S. at 23, 25-26.
59 Id. at 18. The Court stated:
At least so long as there is no showing of an intent to incite disobedience to
or disruption of the draft, Cohen could not, consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the
inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected.
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words" construction should be reformulated to require the state to
prove two distinct elements in order to prosecute an offender. For the
statute to apply prima facie, the state would first have to demonstrate
the intrinsic offensiveness and the intentional provocativeness of the
language spoken.60 It would next be required to show that the extrinsic
volatility of the circumstances, aggravated by this language, created
such an explosive atmosphere that an immediate breach of the peace
was likely to erupt.6 ' Such a test would invalidate the incorrect
assumption, ancillary to the "fighting words" concept, that certain
epithets are as a matter of common knowledge inherently likely to
provoke a violent reaction. It would, therefore, remove undue emphasis on the innate vulgarity of the language and would compel the
prosecution to demonstrate that the exigent circumstances intensified
62
the offensiveness of the words to the level of substantive danger.
The "fighting words" standard does not mean that a speaker's
constitutional right of free speech is dictated by the emotional disposition of the hearer, for the first amendment protects a speaker from
60 Profaci established the mens rea requisite for a conviction under the offensive
language statute:
The words must be spoken with the intent to have the above effect or with a
reckless disregard of the probability of the above consequences.
56 N.J. at 353, 266 A.2d at 584.
The United States Supreme Court has also indicated that scienter is a constitutional
requirement in first amendment cases. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
643-45 (1968); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966).
61 See In re B.N., 99 N.J. Super. 30, 238 A.2d 486 (App. Div. 1968) (court looked
at both the circumstances and the words spoken).
62 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), wherein Justice Brandeis stated:
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
Id. at 376 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring). Justice Brandeis further reasoned:
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability
of serious injury to the State.
Id. at 378.
Although Whitney was subsequently overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), the latter decision served to reinforce the thrust of Justice Brandeis' argument. The Court determined that a state statute which fails to distinguish between
mere advocacy of violence and actual incitement to imminent lawless action impermissibly impinges upon the freedoms protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 448.

One commentator has observed:
The Court's answer in Brandenburg is that more is needed than content analysis. The incitement must be to "imminent lawless action" (a condition which
itself is unlikely to be satisfied by words spoken or written where no imminent
action could follow), and it must be "likely to incite or produce such action."
Linde, supra note 57, at 1185 (emphasis added).
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state interference where the ideas voiced spark a hostile reaction by the
audience. 63 The "fighting words" concept should only apply where
there is in fact an intentional provocation personally aimed at another with the probable consequence of eliciting a physical altercation. 4 The inherent offensiveness of the utterance may be gauged by
the quality and intensity of emotive speech currently tolerated within
the community, 5 whereas the imminence of physical violence must be
measured by the probability of physical retaliation by a particular
addressee in light of the surrounding circumstances in each case.
If applied to Brown, this approach may have led the court to
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), the Court said:
It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some
of their hearers.
-The distinction must be clearly drawn between hostile reaction by an audience to
the ideas promulgated by a speaker, and physical retaliation by an individual addressee
to the intentional insults uttered by the provocateur. In the former situation it is generally asserted that
the existence of a hostile opposition cannot be grounds for cutting off or curtailing expression. Rather it is the constitutional duty of the government to protect the person seeking to exercise the right of expression.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 337 (1970). See Note, Freedom of
Speech Disturbing the Peace Cases, 18 LoYoLA L. REv. 403, 405 (1972), where the author
stated:
It must be borne in mind that one may not be arrested for employing his right
of free speech simply because what he says arouses the hostility of his listeners.
To that extent the use of the "fighting words" rationale is limited.
64 Emerson cautioned that the use of the fighting words concept should be limited
to situations of imminent retaliatory violence. In those instances where the provocation
takes the form of a face to face insult, then and only then may the "fighting words"
concept be utilized.
Such "fighting words" can be considered the equivalent of knocking a chip off
the shoulder-the traditional symbolic act that puts the parties in the role of
physical combatants. . . . Unless the speaker singles out specific members of his
audience, and addresses insulting or fighting words to them personally, the communication cannot be said to constitute part of action.
T. EMERSON, supra note 63, at 337-38.
65 Discussing the diversity of reaction between various social groups to certain
epithets, one author stated:
Deference is being paid to the sensibilities and privacy claims of the prevalent
groups in society who happen to find certain kinds of erotic communication or
certain kinds of words deeply repulsive, while no comparable concern is shown
for minorities who may have no "hang-ups" about those particular kinds of
communication, but who may be just as deeply offended by different verbal and
visual stimuli which few would seriously propose to exclude from the public
forum.
Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L.
(1973)
REV. 153, 191 (1972) (emphasis in original). Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. (obscenity decision which relied on state community standards to determine what is
obscene).
63
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reach a different outcome. As has been indicated, the fact that the
addressee in Brown was an officer of the law, rather than an ordinary
citizen, would arguably weigh against finding a danger of immediate
violence. Since a police officer is trained to maintain order and to
resist provocation, the probability of personal reprisal is unlikely. 66
Further, the police officer in Brown, having failed to make an arrest
at the scene, swore out his complaint the day after the incident. This
combination of facts tends to evidence a lack of actual peril.
As the New Jersey offensive language statute now stands, the
state may proscribe public utterances only when they constitute
fighting words. Rosenfeld and Brown, however, ostensibly permit the
state to prosecute indecent language loudly spoken by one individual
to another on the premise that such vulgar language is inherently
provocative to the ordinary man. Unless the state judiciary expressly
construes the "fighting words" concept to apply primarily to the
exigent circumstances surrounding the utterance, rather than to the
content of the expression, the advances made by Cohen and Gooding
will have been vitiated.
Antonio Favetta
66 Brown indicates that the addressee's status as a police officer does not mitigate
a threat to the peace. 62 N.J. at 591, 303 A.2d at 888. Authority seems to be divided on
this point. In line with Brown are Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Ill.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Landry v. Boyle, 393 U.S. 220 (1968); Duncan v. United States, 219
A.2d 110 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Whited v. State, 256 Ind. 386, 269 N.E.2d 149 (1971); City
of St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 902 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815
(1961).
Contrary to Brown is the MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment 4(c) (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1961), which states in pertinent part:

Insofar as the theory of disorderly conduct rests on the tendency of the
actor's behavior to provoke violence in others, one must suppose that policemen,
employed and trained to maintain order, would be least likely to be provoked
to disorderly responses.
Id. (footnote omitted). See Oratowski v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 II. App. 2d 551, 123
N.E.2d 146 (1954); City of Columbus v. Guidotti, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 160 N.E.2d 355
(Ct. App. 1958); Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965). See also Lewis
v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Sharpe v.
State, 231 Md. 401, 408, 190 A.2d 628, 632-33 (Hammond, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 946 (1963).

